By Jerry A. Fodor
This number of new and formerly released essays displays the foremost learn and regarded one in all modern preeminent philosophers of brain. the 1st seven essays are philosophical items that target psychological illustration and the foundations of intentionality; they're by way of 4 mental essays on cognitive structure. In his eloquent creation, Fodor indicates how the 2 components are thematically united and epistemologically similar, highlighting his curiosity in discovering possible choices to holistic bills of cognitive content.Jerry A. Fodor is Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers collage and on the urban college of latest York Graduate heart.
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Extra info for A Theory of Content and Other Essays
That is, the fact that it's now faithful to isn't the one that it (mis)represented back when it used to be untrue; that, remember, was the fact that Tom is Swiss. But is the counterfactual intelligible? And, if meaning can change while what is represented stays the same, in what sense does a theory of representation constitute a theory of meaning? You can't tell, for example, that the symbol 'Tom is Armenian' represents Tom's being French unless you happen to know Tom's nationality. Neither of these alternatives seems particularly happy.
But I think too that causal theories have some pretty kinky consequences, and it's these that I want to make explicit. I propose to give the second pretty short shrift, but we'd better have a paragraph or two. " And Stampe says (1975, p. But there is no reason to suppose that the reverse inference holds, and we're about to see that epistemic accounts have problems to which the causal ones are immune. Surely the weather doesn't represent the barometer, so epistemic access can't be sufficient for representation.
They must therefore have some view about what it is for a state to be representational even if (like, say, Loar and Stainaker) they are agnostic about, or hostile toward, identifying beliefs and desires with sentences in the language of thought. Since the theories we'll discuss hold that the relations between a representation and what it represents are typical causal, I shall assume further that S ranges over kinds of things that can be causes. Here again there are ontological deep waters; but I don't propose to stir them up unless I have to.
A Theory of Content and Other Essays by Jerry A. Fodor